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I. INTRODUCTION
The Government has increasingly sought, with some success,
permission to access the targeted computers of suspects in criminal
investigations. Specifically, the applications for search warrants request
authority to use a Trojan device to invade a computer in order to gather
all manner of information. The most powerful of these devices “can
covertly download files, photographs and stored e-mails, or even gather
real-time images by activating cameras connected to computers.”1 These
Trojan devices are known by a number of different names: data
extraction software, network investigative technique (“NIT”), port
reader, harvesting program, remote search, CIPAV for Computer and
Internet Protocol Address Verifier, or IPAV for Internet Protocol
Address Verifier.2 One of the principal benefits of these types of devices
is that they assist law enforcement officials in locating individuals who
are using proxy servers or anonymizing their internet activities in order
to hide their identities linked to the crimes they perpetrate via the
internet.3
In a two-year period, the FBI used such devices around the United
States in at least sixteen major cities, including Buffalo, Charlotte,
Cleveland, Denver, El Paso, Honolulu, Houston, Las Vegas, Los
Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, Omaha, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia,
Phoenix, and St. Louis.4 Some within the FBI have argued that the use of
* Brian L. Owsley, Visiting Assistant Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law; B.A.,
University of Notre Dame; J.D., Columbia University School of Law; M.I.A., Columbia University
School of International and Public Affairs. From 2005 until 2013, the author served as a United
States Magistrate Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. This
Article was written in the author’s private capacity. No official support or endorsement by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas or any other division of the federal
judiciary is intended or should be inferred.
1. Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBI’s Search for ‘Mo,’ Suspect in Bomb Threats,
Highlights Use of Malware for Surveillance, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2013/12/06/352ba174-5397-11e3-9e2ce1d01116fd98_story.html; see also Laura K. Donohue, FISA Reform, 10 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR
INFO. SOC’Y 599, 623 (2014) (“Network investigative techniques . . . allow the FBI to covertly
download files, photographs, and stored emails, or even to activate cameras located on computers,
allowing the government to obtain real-time images.”).
2. See Yale Law School Information Society Project, Law Enforcement and Hacking
(Feb.
18,
2014),
http://new.livestream.com
Conference,
LIVESTREAM
/yalelaw/LawEnforcementAndHacking (discussion by Laura Donahue); Declan McCullagh, FBI
Pressures Internet Providers to Install Surveillance Software, CNET (Aug. 2, 2013, 12:26 PM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-pressures-internet-providers-to-install-surveillance-software/; Kevin
Poulsen, Documents: FBI Spyware Has Been Snaring Extortionists, Hackers for Years, WIRED
(Apr. 16, 2009, 9:33 PM), http://www.wired.com/2009/04/fbi-spyware-pro/.
3. Poulsen, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/cipav/FBI_CIPAV-
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these devices does not require any judicial authorization.5
These various devices are “designed to infiltrate a target’s computer
and gather a wide range of information, which it secretly sends to an FBI
server in eastern Virginia.”6 Much of how the Government uses this type
of technology is secret; however, the software has been designed to
collect several types of data after infiltrating a computer.7 Specifically,
when the Government is able to use this type of software it may obtain a
computer’s internet protocol (“IP”) address,8 Media Access Control
address, a list of any open ports, a list of any running programs, the
operating system along with the version and its serial number, the type
and version of the internet browser, the most recently visited URL, the
register computer name and company, and the currently logged-in user
name.9
Imagine being the parent of a child who has engaged in some type
of criminal activity involving computers and an email account. The
investigating federal agency learns some information, including an email
address. Based on this information, an agent applies for a search warrant
from the nearest federal magistrate judge to send an electronic
surveillance device via the known email address to a computer to obtain
additional information. Of course, this information may lead back to the
parent’s computer and compromise that individual’s personal and
financial records. Additionally, because the federal agency performs the
search based on known information such as an email address, the
targeting device may be used on any computer to which the individual
with the targeted email address logs on. Such computers could include
the computers of family, friends, and even public-access computers at
libraries or schools.
10.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); see also Jennifer Lynch, New FBI Documents Provide Details on
Government’s Surveillance Spyware, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2011),
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/04/new-fbi-documents-show-depth-government.
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
5. Email
message
dated
Aug.
24,
2005,
ELEC.
https://www.eff.org/files/FBI_CIPAV-14-p36.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015); Lynch, supra note 4.
6. Poulsen, supra note 2.
7. Kevin Poulsen, FBI’s Secret Spyware Tracks Down Teen Who Made Bomb Threats,
SECLISTS.ORG (July 19, 2007, 12:33 AM), http://seclists.org/isn/2007/Jul/78; Lynch, supra note 4.
8. An “Internet Protocol number” is “[t]he unique identification of the location of an enduser’s computer, the IP address serves as a routing address for email and other data sent to that
computer over the internet from other end-users.” Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393,
407 (2d Cir. 2004). “Every computer connected to the Internet has a unique Internet Protocol (“IP”)
address, . . . which are long strings of numbers, such as 64.233.161.147.” Liberty Media Holdings,
LLC v. Letyagin, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1116 n.2 (D. Nev. 2013); see also Orin S. Kerr, Digital
Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 284 (2005) (“An IP address is
the internet equivalent of a telephone number”).
9. Poulsen, supra note 7; Lynch, supra note 4.
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This Article addresses the use of Trojan devices by the Government
to legally search computers potentially around the world. Although the
Government does seek judicial authorization for these techniques based
on a search warrant, there are still concerns about whether the
applications meet constitutional standards as well as Rule 41 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 41”).
The use of these Trojan devices has not been addressed in current
scholarship meaningfully; therefore, this Article focuses on when and
how authorization of search warrant applications for these techniques are
appropriate. Part II addresses the implications of the standards
enunciated in the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 in ascertaining
whether a search warrant should be issued. Next, Part III discusses four
search warrant applications seeking authorization for the techniques
discussed in Part II and analyzes whether the search warrants were
appropriate. Finally, in Part IV, the Article concludes by addressing the
privacy concerns that put these search methods in direct opposition with
both constitutional protections and procedural requirements for search
warrants. The Article proposes solutions to avoid the overreaching and
invasive concerns that the use of Trojan device search methods can
create.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND RULE 41 CIRCUMSCRIBE THE
PARAMETERS IN WHICH APPLICATIONS FOR TROJAN DEVICES ARE
PERMITTED
The Government has sought to use these Trojan devices pursuant to
a search warrant as compared to other types of electronic surveillance in
which the Government has attempted to avoid obtaining a warrant.10 The
framers of the Constitution instilled within the Fourth Amendment “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”11 Additionally, the
Fourth Amendment establishes that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause.”12 Finally, in seeking a search warrant, the agent must

10. See generally Brian L. Owsley, The Fourth Amendment Implications of the Government’s
Use of Cell Tower Dumps in its Electronic Surveillance, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 15-16 (2013)
[hereinafter Owsley, Cell Tower Dumps] (discussing the Government’s practice of seeking cell
tower dumps pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) because it is a lesser standard than Rule 41); Brian L.
Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
183, 199-200 (2014) (discussing the Government’s practice of seeking orders authorizing cell site
simulators pursuant to the federal pen register statute because it has a very low standard).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Id.
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describe with particularity “the places to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”13
Rule 41 defines the parameters by which the Government could
obtain a search warrant or other seizures based on a probable cause
standard consistent with the Fourth Amendment.14 Moreover, this rule
establishes that a warrant may be issued to obtain “evidence of a crime”
or “property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a
crime.”15 Given that the typical position in each of these warrant
applications is that a computer and an email address were being used to
perpetrate various crimes, the applications all satisfy Rule 41(c).
However, the problem for the Government, and the tension within the
case examples that demonstrates at least one was incorrectly decided, is
that Rule 41 is not as expansive as the Government would like.
Specifically, Rule 41(b) outlines a number of bases in which a
magistrate judge has the authority to issue a warrant:
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is
reasonably available, a judge of a state court of record in the district—
has authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or
property located within the district;
(2) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to
issue a warrant for a person or property outside the district if the
person or property is located within the district when the warrant is
issued but might move or be moved outside the district before the
warrant is executed;
(3) a magistrate judge—in an investigation of domestic terrorism or
international terrorism—with authority in any district in which
activities related to the terrorism may have occurred has authority to
issue a warrant for a person or property within or outside that district;
(4) a magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to
issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the
warrant may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a
person or property located within the district, outside the district, or
both; and
(5) a magistrate judge having authority in any district where activities
related to the crime may have occurred, or in the District of Columbia,
may issue a warrant for property that is located outside the jurisdiction
of any state or district, but within any of the following:
13.
14.
15.
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(A) a United States territory, possession, or commonwealth;
(B) the premises—no matter who owns them—of a United States
diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state, including any
appurtenant building, part of a building, or land used for the mission’s
purposes; or
(C) a residence and any appurtenant land owned or leased by the
United States and used by United States personnel assigned to a United
16
States diplomatic or consular mission in a foreign state.

In other words, the rule outlines five ways in which magistrate judges
have authority to issue search warrants. This subsection of Rule 41 is
especially significant given that, in each of the applications regarding
Trojan devices, the Government requests the issuance of a search
warrant. The issue that arises is whether the issuance of a search warrant
is appropriate in a given application.
The first one—subsection (b)(1)—is the most straightforward,
indeed virtually axiomatic. A magistrate judge may authorize the search
or seizure of property within the district in which the judge sits.17 The
relevant question for the magistrate judge to entertain regarding this
subsection is not where the crime occurred, but where the search is to
take place.18 As one commentator explained, “traditionally warrants
have only been allowed to search for property in that district.”19
Subsection (b)(2) is a variation of the first subsection in that it
concerns property to be searched or seized within the district even
though the property may no longer be in the district at the time the
warrant is executed.20 Thus, while historically there were only a few
narrow exceptions that permitted search warrants regarding property

16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
17. See United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 446 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
Kernell, No. 3:08-CR-142, 2010 WL 1408437, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2010) (“Rule 41(b) . . .
limits a Magistrate Judge’s authority to issue warrants only for property within the district.”);
United States v. Hernandez, No. 3:08-CR-142, 2008 WL 4748576, at *16 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2008)
(“the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge which, as a general proposition, is limited to
the District in which he or she sits”).
18. See United States v. McVicker, No. 3:11-CR-00101-SI, 2012 WL 860412, at *2 (D. Or.
Mar. 13, 2012).
19. Orin S. Kerr, The Modest Role of the Warrant Clause in National Security Investigations,
88 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1680 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, The Modest Role of the Warrant Clause];
accord Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1014 (2010) [hereinafter Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment].
20. See United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also United States v.
Krueger, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035 (D. Kan. 2014); In re Emachines Computer Model No. S1940,
No. C-12-740M, 2012 WL 3259897, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2012).
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outside the magistrate judge’s district, those exceptions have been
broadened in recent years.21
Indeed, most decisions focus on situations in which Rule 41(b)(2) is
inapplicable. For example, in United States v. Glover, the FBI was
investigating the defendant for distribution of PCP and heroin when it
sought and obtained a warrant from a federal judge in the District of
Columbia to place a recording device in Glover’s truck.22 Although it
was clear at the time of the search warrant application that this truck was
parked in the Baltimore area, the warrant nonetheless authorized the
agents to enter the truck outside of the District of Columbia.23
Subsequently, Glover was recorded in this truck discussing his narcotics
trafficking business, which led to his arrest and conviction.24 On appeal,
Glover challenged the warrant authorizing the recording device placed in
his truck in Maryland.25 In response, the Government argued “that it is
perfectly permissible for a district judge to authorize the placement of
such an electronic listening device on a vehicle anywhere in the United
States.”26 Ultimately, the court concluded that Rule 41(b)(2) was “crystal
clear” in that the warrant violated the rule such that any evidence based
on the recording device must be excluded.27
Similarly, in United States v. Krueger, a federal agent was
investigating information that the defendant was engaged in the
possession and distribution of child pornography.28 In the course of his
investigation, the agent determined that Krueger resided in Emporia,
Kansas, for which he in turn was able to get a search warrant issued by a
magistrate judge sitting in Wichita, Kansas.29 During execution of the
warrant, the agent learned that Krueger and his computer were in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.30 The agent then prepared a second search

21. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment, supra note 19, at 1014 n.29.
22. Glover, 736 F.3d at 510.
23. Id.; United States v. Vann, No. 07-CR-247(JMR/RLE), 2007 WL 4321969, at *22 (D.
Minn. Dec. 6, 2007) (magistrate judge in Minnesota issued a search warrant for a house in Superior,
Wisconsin); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (U.S. 2012) (a warrant authorizing
a GPS tracking device was authorized in the District of Columbia, but executed in Maryland).
24. Glover, 736 F.3d at 511.
25. Id. at 512.
26. Id. (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 515; Vann, 2007 WL 4321969, at *22 (magistrate judge in Minnesota had no
authority to issue a search warrant for a house in Superior, Wisconsin); see also Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
949, 953 (the installation of the GPS tracking device constituted a Fourth Amendment search that
required a minimum degree of protection be afforded to the subject of the search).
28. United States v. Krueger, 998 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1033-34 (D. Kan. 2014).
29. Id. at 1034.
30. Id.
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warrant application, indicating that the computer was in Oklahoma, but
nonetheless seeking authorization from a Kansas magistrate judge to
seize and search Krueger’s computer in Oklahoma.31 Indeed, the
computer was initially seized but not searched in part because of
concerns about the warrant issued by the Kansas magistrate judge.32 In a
motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the second warrant
concerning Oklahoma violates Rule 41(b).33 The Government argued
that “the property could have been moved at the time the warrant was
requested” so that it satisfied Rule 41(b)(2) and that the rule was
ambiguous.34 The district court rejected these arguments, finding that the
warrant was void ab initio and suppressing the evidence from the
defendant’s computer as well as his statements.35
Regarding subsection (b)(3), Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act
in 2001,36 which empowered magistrate judges to authorize search
warrants related to both domestic and international terrorism regardless
of whether the property to be searched or seized is within the district.37
Additionally, the Act defined domestic terrorism in order to provide
further guidance.38
Next, subsection (b)(4) allows magistrate judges to authorize the
installation of a tracking device inside a district which would then track
the movement of the targeted individual or property inside or outside of
that district. This subsection resulted from an amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in 2006.39 Courts had previously concluded
that a warrant was not necessary if the tracking device is installed on a

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1035.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1036-37; see also In re Emachines Computer Model No. S1940, No. C-12-740M,
2012 WL 3259897, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. July 19, 2012) (rejecting a search warrant in the Southern
District of Texas pursuant to Rule 41(b)(2) for a computer that had been removed from that district
and taken to the Western District of Texas).
36. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
37. Id. § 219; United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *52 n.33
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007); see also Gerald G. Ashdown, The Blueing of America: The Bridge
Between The War On Drugs And The War On Terrorism, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 789-90 (2006).
38. USA Patriot Act of 2001 § 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2012)); see also id. §
2331(1) (defining international terrorism).
39. United States v. Asghedom, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1167,1168 (N.D. Ala. 2014); United States
v. Hersman, No. 2:13-cr-00002, 2013 WL 1966047, at *8 (S.D. W.Va. May 10, 2013); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3117(a) (“a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other order for the installation of a
mobile tracking device, such order may authorize the use of that device within the jurisdiction of the
court, and outside that jurisdiction if the device is installed in that jurisdiction”).
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public street on the exterior of a vehicle.40 However, following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, a warrant was deemed required.41
Finally, in 2008, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were
again amended to include subsection (b)(5), providing a fifth basis for
magistrate judges to authorize search warrants: warrants for crimes
outside the district’s jurisdiction, but in areas over which the United
States exercises control.42 This area ranges from territories of the United
States such as Guam or the Virgin Islands to the various American
diplomatic and consular buildings around the world.
III. BOTH RULE 41 AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RAISE QUESTIONS
ABOUT WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT’S SEARCH WARRANT
APPLICATIONS FOR TROJAN DEVICES SHOULD SO READILY BE
GRANTED
Although there are anecdotal reports of dozens of applications by
federal agents using Trojan devices, there are not nearly as many
examples available for analysis. No doubt, the paucity of examples is
partly because the FBI wants to keep the use of this technology from
public knowledge.43 Moreover, these applications are sealed when filed,
and often judges do not unseal such applications.44 To the extent that the
Government is putting more judicial records online, any searches would
be thwarted by the limited availability of sealed records in electronic
databases.45 Consequently, without knowing specific file numbers,
anyone researching these types of applications must manually search
40. United States v. Smith, 387 F. App’x 918, 920-21 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).
41. Asghedom, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 1170-71 (discussing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(U.S. 2012)).
42. Kerr, The Modest Role of the Warrant Clause, supra note 19, at 1680-81; see also David
A. Schlueter, Criminal Procedure Rules Pending Public Comment, 21 CRIM. JUST. 45, 45-46 (2007)
(“The proposed addition of new Rule 41(b)(5) is intended to fill a perceived gap in the authority of
magistrate judges to issue search warrants for property located outside the United States but within
the jurisdictional control of the United States.”).
43. See Declan McCullagh, FBI Remotely Installs Spyware to Trace Bomb Threat, CNET
(July 18, 2007, 9:42 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-remotely-installs-spyware-to-trace-bombthreat/; Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant at 5, In re Any Computer Accessing
Electronic Message(s) Directed to Administrator(s) of MySpace Account “Timberlinebombinfo”
and Opening Message(s) Delivered to That Account by the Government, No. 07-mj-5114 (W.D.
Wash. June 12, 2007) [hereinafter In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application].
44. See generally Brian L. Owsley, To Unseal or Not to Unseal: The Judiciary’s Role in
Preventing Transparency in Electronic Surveillance Applications and Orders, 5 CALIF. L. REV.
CIRCUIT 259 (2014).
45. The E-Government Act of 2002 was enacted mandating that the federal government,
including the judiciary, make information electronically available to the public. Pub. L. 107-347, §
205, 115 Stat. 2899 (2002); see also 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012).
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through the dockets of each federal courthouse in the hopes of finding
some record that would by its meager caption or description indicate it is
an application for a Trojan device.
Alternatively, a researcher or an investigator could attempt to use
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)46 to obtain information
regarding such applications. However, such requests are not likely to
bear much fruit. Quite likely, the Government would assert that such
information is exempt from FOIA for national security reasons.47 This
exemption would be available in any case involving terrorism.
Alternatively, the FBI could argue that the law enforcement exemption
would apply regarding its investigations and electronic surveillance
techniques.48
That leaves us with just a few exemplars of the use of these devices.
As becomes evident, the federal government makes many similar
representations, explanations, and descriptions regarding Trojan devices.
A.

The Western District of Washington
1. Facts and Circumstances

In June 2007, an agent with the FBI investigating a series of bomb
threats against a Lacey, Washington high school filed a search warrant
seeking authorization to install a Trojan device on any computer
accessing a MySpace account.49 Specifically, the agent alleged that he
had probable cause to use a CIPAV on the MySpace
“Timberlinebombinfo” account as well as several email addresses.50
The agent explained the technology by noting that “a CIPAV
utilizes standard Internet computer commands commonly used
commercially over local area networks (LANs) and the Internet to
request that an activating computer respond to the CIPAV by sending
46. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
47. Id. § 552(b)(1); accord Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 833
(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1271 (U.S. 2011) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)) (“[T]he Government has other tools at hand to shield national security
information and other sensitive materials. Most notably, Exemption 1 of FOIA prevents access to
classified documents.”); see also In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43, at 5.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E); accord Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 746 F.3d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Public Employees for Envt’l
Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary and Water Comm’n, U.S.-Mex., 740 F.3d 195, 202
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
49. In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43; see generally Paul Ohm, Good
Enough Privacy, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 26-28 (2008) (discussing the case).
50. In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43, at 4.
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network level messages, and/or other variables, and/or registry
information, over the Internet to a computer controlled by the FBI.”51 He
further cautioned that “[t]he exact nature of these commands, processes,
capabilities and their configuration is classified as a law enforcement
sensitive investigative technique, the disclosure of which would likely
jeopardize other on-going investigations and/or future use of the
technique.”52 Finally, he described the information that would likely be
obtained by the use of the CIPAV: “the computer’s true assigned IP
address, MAC address, open communications ports, list of running
programs, operating system (type, version, and serial number), internet
browser and version, language encoding, registered computer name,
registered company name, current logged-in user name, and Uniform
Resource Locator (URL) that the target computer was previously
connected to.”53
On May 30, 2007, school officials evacuated Timberline High
School in Lacey, Washington, after discovering a handwritten bomb
threat note.54 On June 4, 2007, they received an email from
dougbriggs123@gmail.com indicating that “I will be blowing up your
school Monday, June 4, 2007. There are 4 bombs planted throughout
timberline high school. One in the math hall, library hall, main office
and one portable. The bombs will go off in 5 minute intervals at 9:15
AM.”55 The sender further threatened that “[t]he email server of your
district will be offline starting at 8:45 am,” and subsequently the school
district experienced a Denial-of-Service attack.56 As a result, school
officials evacuated Timberline High School.57
The next day, Timberline High School officials received an email
from dougbrigs@gmail.com with another bomb threat:
Now that the school is scared from yesturdays [sic] fake bomb threat
it’s now time to get serious. One in a gym locker, the girls. It’s in a
locker hidden under a pile of clothes. The other four I will only say the
general location. One in the Language Hall, One in the math hall, One
underneath a portable taped with strong ducktape [sic]. This bomb will
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id.; Nate Anderson, FBI Uses Spyware to Bust Bomb Threat Hoaxster, ARS TECHNICA
(July 18, 2007, 11:34 AM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2007/07/fbi-uses-virus-to-bust-bombthreat-hoaxster/; see also Poulsen, supra note 7; Lynch, supra note 4.
54. In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43, at 6.
55. Id. at 6-7. The dougbriggs123@gmail.com account was created on June 3, 2007, with the
IP address of 80.76.80.103. Id. at 10-11.
56. In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43, at 7.
57. Id.
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go off if any vibrations are felt. And the last one, Is in a locker. It is
enclosed in a soundproof package, and litteraly [sic] undetectable. I
have used a variety of chemicals to make the bombs. They are all different kinds. They will go off at 10:15AM. Through remote detonation.
58
Good Luck.

Additionally, the message challenged and taunted the reader about the
lack of success in gathering information about yesterday’s threat.
Specifically, it indicated that the email account was created in Italy and
the sender unidentifiable.59 Later that day, school officials received
another email from dougbriggs234@gmail.com:
Hello Again. Seeing as how you’re too stupid to trace the email back
lets [sic] get serious.” [The UNSUB(s) mentions 6 bombs set to detonate between 10:45-11:15 AM, and adds] Seriously, you are not going
to catch me. So just give up. Maybe you should hire Bill Gates to tell
you that it is coming from Italy. HAHAHA Oh wait I already told you
that. So stop pretending to be “tracing it” because I have already told
you it’s coming from Italy. That is where trace will stop so just stop
60
trying.

Based on these two emails, school officials evacuated the high school
that day.
On June 6, 2007, the Timberline High School principal received an
email from dougbriggs911@gmail.com telling him to “ENJOY YOUR
LIFE ENDING.”61 That same day, a second email from this account
explicitly threatened the school as well as taunted those who were
seeking his identity:
Well hello Timberline, today is June 6, 2007 and I”M [sic] just emailing you today to say that school will blow up and that’s final! There
are 2 bombs this time (Iran [sic] short on money to buy things at home
depot). They will go off at exactly 10:45:00 AM. One is located on a
portable. And the other is somewhere else. Keep trying to ‘trace’ this
email. The only thing you will be able to track is that it came from Italy. There is no other information that leads it back to the United States
in any way so get over it. You should hire Bill Gates to track it for you.
Also, stop advising teachers to no [sic] show this email to classmates.
Everyone would be ammused [sic] by this email and I might stop if
you do. Funny how I can trick you all into thinking that I included my
name to show that it isn’t me, because who the hell would put their
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol48/iss2/4

12

Owsley: Beware of Government Agents

2015]

BEWARE OF GOVERNMENT AGENTS

name? . . . .

327

62

Again, school officials evacuated the high school that day.
On June 7, 2007, another threat was sent to the school by email
from thisisfromitaly@gmail.com: “There are 3 bombs planted in the
school and they’re all different kinds. I have premade these weeks in
advance and tested the timers to make sure they work to the exact
millisecond. Locking the doors is a good plan, but too late.”63 Based on
this threat, Timberline High School was evacuated again.
On June 7, 2007, the agent alleged that the subject of the
investigation posed three threatening messages in the comments section
of a local online newspaper. After the newspaper removed them, they
were posted again before the newspaper disabled the comments
section.64 These threats came from IP address 192.135.29.30, which was
associated with the National Institute of Nuclear Physics in Italy.65
Additionally on June 7, 2007, the county sheriff’s office advised
the Lacey Police Department about an individual who complained of
receiving a MySpace invitation from the “Timberlineinfo” MySpace
profile wanting her to post “htttp://bombermails.hypephp.com” on her
MySpace page.66 If she failed to do as requested, she was warned that
her name would be associated with future bomb threats.67 The parent of
a Timberline High School student also called about a similar request and
threat that her son received.68 In total, 33 students reported similar
requests and threats, but none of them ultimately had any useful
information.69
Two of the individuals who received a MySpace invitation from
“Timberlineinfo” accepted the invitation and then received an instant
message from screen name “Alexspi3ring_09.”70 When one of the
individuals sent a message regarding more information about the bomb
threats, the instant messages from the sender stopped.71 Alex Spiering
was a student at Timberline High School at that time and used to have a
MySpace webpage with the same graphics as those used in the instant

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
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Id. at 9-10.
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messages.72
On June 8, 2007, district school officials received two separate
bomb threats from Timberline.Sucks@gmail.com.73 Consequently,
Timberline High School was evacuated.
The
IP
for
dougbriggs123@gmail.com
and
the
“Timberlinebombinfo” MySpace account were both the same:
80.76.80.103.74 This IP address was associated with an Italian internet
provider.75
On June 12, 2007, a federal magistrate judge authorized the search
warrant for the MySpace account “Timberlinebombinfo.”76 The next
day, the FBI executed the CIPAV on the targeted computer via the
internet and obtained a CD-ROM worth of data.77 Within a couple of
days, based on the Government’s use of a CIPAV, a tenth-grader was
arrested and charged with making the bomb threats.78 This person, who
was fifteen-years-old at the time of arrest, pled guilty to making bomb
threats, harassment, and identity theft for which he received ninety days
in a juvenile facility.79
2. The Court’s Rationale
Although in hindsight it is apparent that the computer was within
the Western District of Washington when the warrant was issued, there
was no evidence in the application to establish this fact; thus, neither
Rule 41(b)(1) or Rule 41(b)(2) applied in this case.80 Similarly, the agent
was not requesting a tracking device, so Rule 41(b)(4) did not apply.81
Finally, Rule 41(b)(5) did not apply because it was not alleged that the
computer was on United States territory or property.82
That left just Rule 41(b)(3) as the territorial basis for any search
warrant. Although the application did not mention this subsection, it did
explain that the warrant sought information for a criminal investigation
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 10-12.
Id. at 11.
In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43.
Anderson, supra note 53.
Seattle Times Staff, Lacey 10th-grader Arrested in Threats to Bomb School, SEATTLE
TIMES
(June
14,
2007,
4:01
PM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2003747761_webthreats14m.html.
79. McCullagh, supra note 43.
80. See generally In re “Timberlinebombinfo” Application, supra note 43.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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into both an interstate transmission of a communication containing a
threat to injure a person as well as the use of a computer to cause a threat
to public safety.83 The making of bomb threats constitutes terrorism.84
Here, the application met the territorial requirement based on an
investigation of terrorism so that the specific location of the computer
was legally irrelevant.
B.

The District of Colorado
1. Facts and Circumstances

In October 2012, a federal agent with the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives sought a search warrant from a
United States magistrate judge in the District of Colorado.85 Specifically,
the agent sought to search “the computer activating the network
investigative technique (‘NIT’) that may assist in identifying the
computer, its location, other information about the computer, and the
user of the computer.”86 In the application, he requested a long list of
information, including the targeted computer’s IP address; its media
access control address; its open communication ports; the names of
programs it was operating, including the name and version of the web
browser; the type of operating system run by the computer; its time zone
information; its language encoding and default language; wire and
wireless internet network connection information; user name and
accounts; and previously used URLs.87
The special agent testified that the initial contact with the subject of
the investigation took place on July 22, 2012, when he telephoned the
Arapahoe County Sheriff’s Office with a bomb threat.88 Specifically, the
caller, who identified himself as Andrew Ryan and spoke with an accent,
sought the release of James Holmes89 from custody.90 He threatened to
83. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5, 16.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Garey, 546 F.3d 1359, 1361 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
85. Application for a Search Warrant, In re Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”) for
email address texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT (D. Colo. Oct. 9, 2012)
[hereinafter In re NIT for texas.slayer@yahoo.com]; Steven M. Bellovin et al., Lawful Hacking:
Using Existing Vulnerabilities for Wiretapping on the Internet, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1,
83 (2014) (characterizing this as the first time that the FBI sought a search warrant for a CIPAV).
86. Application for a Search Warrant, supra note 85, at Attachment A.
87. Id. at Attachment B.
88. Id. at 3 (Affidavit of Craig Roegner, ¶ 4 [hereinafter Roegner]).
89. James Holmes is the suspect charged with killing twelve people in an Aurora, Colorado,
movie theater on July 20, 2012. See Jack Healy, Mental Evaluations Endorse Insanity Plea in
Colorado
Shootings,
Defense
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
13,
2013),

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

15

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 4

330

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:315

blow up the Arapahoe County Jail with a bomb made of ammonium
nitrate if James Holmes was not released.91 The deputy sheriffs
determined that the caller was using a voice over internet connection
with telephone number (760) 705-8888.92 Because of the poor quality of
the internet connection as well as the subject’s accent, the deputy
sheriffs conducted a written conversation with the caller through the
email account soozanvf@gmail.com.93
Over the next several days, a person, who spoke with an accent
identifying himself as Andrew Ryan, contacted the Arapahoe County
Sheriff’s Department threatening to blow up the county jail if James
Holmes was not released. These calls were made using telephone
number (760) 705-8888.94 Moreover, deputies received similar threats
from the email account soozanvf@gmail.com.95
On July 25, 2012, a person, who spoke with an accent identifying
himself as Andrew Ryan, contacted the Arapahoe County Sheriff’s
Department using telephone number (760) 705-8888 and informed them
that he and his associates had shot and killed three people at the Cherry
Creek Reservoir in Arapahoe County and left them in the reservoir.96 A
search ultimately revealed no victims.
On July 30, 2012, the Greenwood Village Police Department
received a telephone call about a bomb threat to blow up a Doubletree
Hotel. A police officer was sent to the hotel because the person making
the threats was still on the phone. When the officer arrived, he spoke on
the telephone with a man who had an accent also identifying himself as
Andrew Ryan. This caller told the officer that he had placed bombs
made with ammonium nitrate in the hotel to blow it up if James Holmes
was not released.97 While the officer was talking with the caller, he
heard another person telling the caller how many bombs were in the
hotel and how much time remained before they exploded. After
evacuating the hotel, a search did not reveal any bombs. However, this
time, the caller used phone number (877) 573-9800, which was a Voice

www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/james-holmes-aurora-shooting-suspect-enters-insanityplea.html?_r=0.
90. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 4; see also Yale Law School Information Society Project,
supra note 2 (discussion by Laura Donahue).
91. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 4.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
95. Id. ¶ 5.
96. Id. ¶ 8.
97. Id. ¶ 9.
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Over Internet Protocol server phone number.98
On the morning of July 31, 2012, a person, who spoke with an
accent again identifying himself as Andrew Ryan, contacted the Denver
International Airport. He claimed that he and his friends had placed
bombs on airplanes and in the baggage area, threatening to blow up the
airport if James Holmes was not released.99 Caller identification revealed
that the telephone call was made from (760) 705-8888, which was
assigned to the Google Voice G-mail system.100
On the afternoon of August 14, 2012, a telephone call to officials
with the county jail in Aurora, Colorado, warned of a bomb threat. The
caller identified himself as Alex Anderson and threatened to put
ammonium nitrate bombs around Aurora if James Holmes was not
released. This call was again made using telephone number (760) 7058888 through the Google voice system.101
On the evening of September 12, 2012, a person, identifying
himself as Jason, called the Denver International Airport to report that an
ammonium nitrate bomb was checked onto United Flight 6318 to Fargo,
North Dakota, and was set to detonate upon arrival. He further indicated
that he was affiliated with Al Qaeda and was going to blow up the
airplane in response to American military actions. This call also was
made using telephone number (760) 705-8888 through the Google voice
system.102
On September 9, 2012, a person emailed some photographs to a
Denver police sergeant from soozanvf@gmail.com, including one of an
Iranian man in a military uniform. The sender told the sergeant that his
name was Mohammed.103 On September 16, 2012, Mohammed again
contacted the sergeant indicating that he had made bomb threats to the
University of Texas and North Dakota State University. He further
explained that because his soozanvf@gmail.com had been disabled by
Google, he could now be reached at Texas.Slayer@yahoo.com.104 The
sergeant received several emails from this new account in which
Mohammed admitted to making bomb threats against numerous
98. Id. ¶ 10.
99. Id. ¶ 12; see also Will C. Holden, Denver International Airport Confirms Non-specific
Bomb Threat, FOX 31 DENVER (July 31, 2012, 2:11 PM), http://kdvr.com/2012/07/31/denverinternational-airport-confirms-non-specific-bomb-threat/.
100. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 12.
101. Id. ¶ 15.
102. Id. ¶ 17.
103. Id. ¶ 16; see also Yale Law School Information Society Project, supra note 2 (discussion
by Laura Donahue); Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 1.
104. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 18.
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universities and airports across the United States.105
On October 9, 2012, the magistrate judge authorized a search
warrant for the Network Investigative Technique of the email address for
Texas.Slayer@yahoo.com.106 On October 19, 2012, the federal agent
filed an application for an amended search warrant in order to “better
clarif[y] how the NIT will function.”107 These clarifications sought to
explain more clearly how the device authorized by the search warrant
would be used.108 Moreover, the affidavit contained some handwritten
addenda by the agent. For example, he noted that the “crime being
investigated is an offense involving international or domestic terrorism
[so that the] warrant is sought under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(3).”109
Moreover, he assured the magistrate judge that the warrant “does not
seek live content of any email messages.”110 On October 19, 2012, the
magistrate judge authorized the amended search warrant for the Network
Investigative
Technique
of
the
email
address
for
111
“Texas.Slayer@yahoo.com.”
On October 29, 2012, a task force officer filed an application for a
second amended search warrant in order to correct typographical errors
in the first two applications.112 That same day, the magistrate judge
authorized the second amended search warrant for the Network
Investigative
Technique
of
the
email
address
for
Texas.Slayer@yahoo.com.113
On December 11, 2012, a task force officer filed an application for
a third amended search warrant in order to “deploy a newly designed
NIT after execution of the original NIT was aborted because it was
determined that the original NIT was not viable as first designed.”114 On
that same day, the magistrate judge authorized the third amended search
warrant for the Network Investigative Technique of the email address for
105. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.
106. Search Warrant, In re NIT for texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT.
107. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 4.
108. Id. ¶¶ 17 n.1, 20 n.2, 21 nn.3-4.
109. Id. ¶ 19; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3).
110. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 20.
111. Amended Search Warrant, In re NIT for texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685KMT.
112. Second Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In re NIT for
texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT (Affidavit of William Gallegos, ¶ 5).
113. Second Amended Search Warrant, In re NIT for texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw05685-KMT.
114. Third Amended Application for a Search Warrant, In re NIT for
texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT (Affidavit of William Gallegos, ¶ 6)
[hereinafter Gallegos].
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Texas.Slayer@yahoo.com.115
On December 14, 2012, the NIT was executed by sending a link to
Texas.Slayer@yahoo.com. The federal agent indicated that the NIT was
only partially successful in that the program in the link did not execute
as designed.116 Nonetheless, the search resulted in information that
implicated two IP addresses located in Iran.117
2. The Court’s Rationale
In the application concerning bomb threats by Mohammed seeking
the release of James Holmes, the magistrate judge did not issue any
decision but simply signed the search warrant, authorizing the use of the
NIT. The federal agent specifically indicated that the warrant was sought
pursuant to Rule 41(b)(3) because the underlying criminal offense
involved terrorism.118 In other words, the FBI acknowledged that only
subsection (b)(3) established the requisite territorial standard.
Looking at the applicability of Rule 41(b)(3), the agent provided a
significant amount of information related to the crimes involving bomb
threats and hoaxes. Moreover, in analyzing the particularity requirement,
this same information was beneficial in finding that standard was
satisfied. Indeed, there was enough evidence within the application to
support a finding of probable cause justifying the search for the
computer because it was involved in criminal activity as well as a search
of the computer using the NIT to obtain evidence of the crime.119
C.

The Western District of Texas
1. Facts and Circumstances

On December 18, 2012, a federal agent with the FBI sought a
search warrant from a United States magistrate judge in the Western
District of Texas.120 Specifically, he wanted to utilize an NIT in order to
115. Third Amended Search Warrant, In re NIT for texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw05685-KMT.
116. Return, In re NIT for texas.slayer@yahoo.com, No. 1:12-sw-05685-KMT; Timberg &
Nakashima, supra note 1.
117. See sources cited supra note 116.
118. Roegner, supra note 88, ¶ 19; Gallegos, supra note 114, ¶ 32.
119. See In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d
753, 758-59 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
120. Application for a Search Warrant, In re Network Investigative Technique (NIT) for
Email Address 512SocialMedia@gmail.com, No. 1:12-mj-748 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 2012)
[hereinafter In re NIT for 512SocialMedia@gmail.com].
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send communications to the targeted computer through an email address
to “help identify the computer, its location, other information about the
computer, and the user of the computer.”121 In the application, he
requested a long list of information, including the targeted computer’s IP
address; its media access control address; its open communication ports;
the names of programs it is operating, including the name and version of
the web browser; the type of operating system run by the computer; its
time zone information; its language encoding and default language; wire
and wireless internet network connection information; user name and
accounts; and previously used URLs.122
In support of the application, the agent asserted there was probable
cause to believe that the email address 512SocialMedia@gmail.com was
being used by Donald Lee Phelps, a fugitive from federal custody.123
Specifically, Phelps was wanted for allegedly defrauding financial
institutions.124
Starting in 2005, Phelps was alleged to have assumed the identity
of his girlfriend’s estranged husband who was serving in the United
States military in Iraq at that time.125 First, he obtained a Florida stateissued identification card in the husband’s name after altering a Texas
driver’s license. In turn, he used the newly-obtained Florida ID to open
an account with a credit union and to get a job at a credit union.126
Eventually, he wrote checks from this account for various expenses as
well as obtained credit cards and loans in his stolen identity. On October
16, 2007, a federal arrest warrant was issued for Phelps for bank
fraud.127
On November 14, 2012, a confidential informant provided law
enforcement officers with a cell phone number for Phelps.128 This person
explained that Phelps had been living in the Austin, Texas, area for
about five years. Using the assumed name of James Bridges, Phelps
operated a business named Extreme Social Media and worked as a
computer programmer. The confidential informant regularly spoke with
Phelps on the cell phone number that was provided to law
enforcement.129
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 7 (Affidavit of Justin Noble, ¶ 6 [hereinafter Noble]).
Id. at Attachment B.
Noble, supra note 121, ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.; Timberg & Nakashima, supra note 1.
Noble, supra note 121, ¶ 4.
Id.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
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On November 20, 2012, a federal magistrate judge signed a search
warrant that authorized federal agents to track Phelps based on the cell
phone number provided by the confidential informant. The next day,
they tracked the cell phone to a hotel in San Antonio, Texas. When
agents arrived at the hotel, employees identified Phelps from a
photograph as a guest of the hotel who had checked out of his room
earlier that day. Phelps had registered using a different false name, Jack
Rady, and paid cash for his room.130
On December 3, 2012, the FBI learned that Phelps was using the
email address JBridges007@gmail.com. The next day, the IP address
was obtained from Google for that email address. It was further
discovered that Phelps was using an IP anonymizer known as
“HideMyAss.com” to hide the IP address that he was actually using to
access his email account.131
On December 10, 2012, a second confidential informant provided
the 512SocialMedia@gmail.com as an email address used by Phelps.132
This person was able to identify a photograph of Phelps.133 Moreover,
that person also provided an account number at Amplify Credit Union
that Phelps was using.134 This credit union account was the account for
Extreme Social Media, the business operated by Phelps. Although this
account was overdrawn, someone accessed it through the internet on
December 8, 2012, from a computer using “HideMyAss.com” to hide
the user’s true IP address.135
On December 18, 2012, a magistrate judge signed the search
warrant authorizing the NIT for 512SocialMedia@gmail.com.136 On
December 20, 2012, federal agents conducted the search.137 The search
warrant return revealed an IP address that was controlled by a provider
in Austin, Texas.138 The device was tracked to a computer, and the NIT
revealed the computer was a Hewlett-Packard using Windows 7 Home
Premium with 3561 MB of total Random Access Memory, with 959 MB
of remaining for use, and a total of 589,663 MB on the hard disk, with

130. Id. ¶ 7.
131. Id. ¶ 8.
132. Id. ¶ 9.
133. Id. ¶ 11.
134. Id. ¶ 9.
135. Id. ¶ 11.
136. Search Warrant, In re NIT for 512SocialMedia@gmail.com, No. 1:12-mj-748 (W.D. Tex.
Dec. 18, 2012).
137. Return at 2, In re NIT for 512SocialMedia@gmail.com, No. 1:12-mj-748.
138. Id. at 3.
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512,540 MB remaining.139 Additionally, it revealed information about
the central processing unit as well as extensive application lists of
various software.140
Ultimately, Phelps was apprehended in Alabama and indicted for
bank fraud and aggravated identity theft in the Northern District of
Florida. On April 3, 2012, he pleaded guilty to both charges and was
sentenced to five years in custody on July 17, 2012.141
2. The Court’s Rationale
In the application for the search warrant targeting Donald Phelps’
email address, the magistrate judge again did not issue any written
decision, but simply signed the form authorizing the use of the NIT.
Here, the underlying criminal offense was bank fraud.142 In other words,
the agent did not allege anything that would establish a claim of
terrorism.143 Thus, the territorial limitation that existed in the Colorado
example did not exist here.
The application provided no evidence that the computer was within
the district at the time the search warrant was sought. Consequently,
Rule 41(b)(1) did not provide a basis for granting the application.144
Similarly, because there was no evidence of the computer’s location,
Rule 41(b)(2) was also inapplicable because location within the district
at the time the warrant was issued was a requirement.145 Because the
application did not seek authorization for a tracking device, Rule
41(b)(4) did not provide any basis for the issuance of a warrant.146
Lastly, Rule 41(b)(5) was inapplicable because the computer was not
located in a United States territory or diplomatic building.
Thus, without even addressing the particularity requirement, there
is a strong argument that this warrant was improvidently granted. Of
course, it does not appear that the warrant’s issuance played any part in
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id.
141. Press Release, FBI, Jacksonville Division, Former Gainesville Resident Sentenced for
Bank Fraud and Identity Theft (July 18, 2013), available at http://www.fbi.gov/jacksonville/pressreleases/2013/former-gainesville-resident-sentenced-for-bank-fraud-and-identity-theft; Timberg &
Nakashima, supra note 1.
142. Noble, supra note 121, ¶ 4.
143. Id.
144. See United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 446 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kernell,
No. 3:08-CR-142, 2010 WL 1408437, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2010).
145. See United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509, 515; United States v. Krueger, 998 F. Supp.
2d 1032, 1035 (D. Kan. 2014).
146. See United States v. Asghedom, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174-75 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
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the capture of Donald Phelps, so there was no incentive for him to
challenge it after his arrest.
D.

The Southern District of Texas
1. Facts and Circumstances

In early 2013, an FBI agent sought a search warrant to target an
unknown computer that allegedly was involved in violating federal laws
regarding bank fraud, computer security, and identity theft. Specifically,
the agent sought “to surreptitiously install data extraction software on
the Target Computer [that will then] search the computer’s hard drive,
random access memory, and other storage media; . . . activate the
computer’s built-in camera; . . . generate latitude and longitude
coordinates for the computer’s location; and . . . transmit the data to FBI
agents within this district” for a monitoring period of thirty days.147 He
requested this warrant in order to obtain a list of information from the
Target Computer, including “records of Internet Protocol addresses
used”; “records of internet activity”; “records evidencing the use of the
Internet Protocol addresses to communicate with the [victim’s bank’s]
email servers”; “evidence of who used, owned, or controlled the
TARGET COMPUTER” during the alleged criminal activity; and
“evidence of times that the TARGET COMPUTER was used.”148
Additionally, because the warrant sought monitoring to continue forward
for thirty days from the time that the surveillance device was installed,
the application also asked for prospective data, including “accounting
entries reflecting the identification of new fraud victims”;
“photographs . . . taken using the TARGET COMPUTER’s built-in
camera . . . to identify the location of the TARGET COMPUTER and
identify persons using” it; and “information about the TARGET
COMPUTER’s physical location, including latitude and longitude
calculations.”149 Essentially, the application sought authorization for the
device to enable them, through the computer, to take a photograph of the

147. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753,
755 (S.D. Tex. 2013); see also Yale Law School Information Society Project, supra note 2
(discussion by Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith).
148. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
755-56; see also Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modern
Surveillance: An Analysis of Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1071, 1089-90 (2013).
149. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
756; see also Bellovin et al., supra note 85, at 83.
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computer user. This would give the agents not only facial recognition,
but longitude and latitude information for the computer that would
enable law enforcement officials to pinpoint geographical location.150
In support of the application, the agent testified that an individual’s
personal email account and the victim’s local bank account were
improperly accessed.151 The IP address for the computer that accessed
this victim’s account was located in a foreign country.152 Once the
victim took measures to secure his email account, a second email
account with an email address nearly identical to the victim’s personal
email address was created. This second email address differed from the
victim’s by only one letter.153 Using this second email address, an
attempt was made to wire transfer the victim’s money from his local
bank to a foreign bank.154
2. The Court’s Rationale
In this application concerning bank fraud, the magistrate judge
denied the search warrant in a written opinion. In denying the warrant,
the judge provided three bases to support his decision: the lack of a
territorial limit pursuant to Rule 41(b); the Fourth Amendment
particularity requirement; and concerns about the constitutional
standards for video camera surveillance.155
Because of the indiscriminate and intrusive nature of video
surveillance, the Fifth Circuit has adopted a heightened standard based
in part on the standard for wiretaps.156 Specifically, the magistrate judge
explained four additional factors beyond probable cause that were
necessary:
Under those standards, a search warrant authorizing video surveillance
must demonstrate not only probable cause to believe that evidence of a
crime will be captured, but also should include: (1) a factual statement
that alternative investigative methods have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or would be too dangerous; (2) a particular description of the type of communication
150. See Yale Law School Information Society Project, supra note 2 (discussion by Magistrate
Judge Stephen Smith).
151. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
755.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 756-61.
156. Id. at 759-60; see also United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 250 (5th Cir.
1987); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (2012).
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sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to
which it relates; (3) a statement of the duration of the order, which
shall not be longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization nor, in any event, longer than 30 days, (though extensions
are possible); and (4) a statement of the steps to be taken to assure that
the surveillance will be minimized to effectuate only the purposes for
157
which the order is issued.

In applying this standard, the court concluded the application failed to
establish that the Government had taken all necessary alternative
approaches to obtain such information.158 Moreover, it explained that
there was no explanation of the measures that would be taken to
minimize the intrusive effect so as to obtain only what was sought in the
search warrant.159
The magistrate judge also found that the Government had failed to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement.160 First, he
noted that the application failed to explain how the device would search
for and contact the targeted computer, in part because use of the
software and how it functions was not discussed.161 Additionally, the
decision addressed that the application failed to indicate how any search
of the computer would reveal any evidence of criminal activity.162
Specifically, the judge questioned the location of the computer,
indicating that it could be in a public place such as a library, internet
café, a job site, or alternatively could be used by family or friends such
that people uninvolved with the alleged criminal activity could be swept
up into the search and have their personal information compromised.163
Most germane to our discussion, the magistrate judge analyzed the
applicability of the five bases in Rule 41 authorizing judges to issue
search warrants.164 He concluded that none of the five subsections
provided a basis for issuing a warrant. Although the application
explicitly relied upon Rule 41(b)(1), it also acknowledged there was no
157. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 760
(citing Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 252).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 760-61; see also Hosein & Palow, supra note 148, at 1090.
160. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
758-59.
161. Id. at 759.
162. Id.; see also Bellovin et al., supra note 85, at 83 (“Arguably, two different court orders
should be obtained.”).
163. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
759; see also Hosein & Palow, supra note 148, at 1090.
164. In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d at
756-58.
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evidence that the targeted computer was within the Southern District of
Texas.165 Notwithstanding the lack of knowledge about the computer’s
location, the Government argued “that subsection authorizes the warrant
‘because information obtained from the Target Computer will first be
examined in this judicial district.’”166 The court rejected this position
because it would essentially provide a basis for any computer search
around the world provided the “information” was not accessed until it
was retrieved and brought back into the district where the warrant was
issued.167 Furthermore, the judge explained that there were two searches
at issue: the search for the computer itself as well as the search for the
information stored on the computer.168 Because neither of these searches
was done within the district, there was no basis for authorizing a warrant
pursuant to Rule 41(b)(1).169
Next, the magistrate judge focused on Rule 41(b)(2), concluding
that this subsection was inapplicable. The Court held this section does
not authorize the search of an object located outside the district when the
search warrant is issued and then brought into the district.170 Instead, it
authorizes the opposite. To allow otherwise would be to essentially
allow a search of anything that ultimately could be located and brought
into the district.171
Finally, the judge rejected the three remaining bases. The criminal
investigation did not involve terrorism, therefore Rule 41(b)(3) was
inapplicable.172 Even if the court allowed an argument that the Trojan
device would be a tracking device, because it seeks to locate the
computer, the Government still could not establish “that the installation
of the ‘tracking device’ (i.e. the software) would take place within this
district.”173 Therefore, Rule 41(b)(4) did not provide a basis for issuing a
search warrant. Because the application did not establish that the
computer was within property or territory controlled by the United
States, Rule 41(b)(5) was also inapplicable.174

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 756.
Id.
Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 757.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 758.
Id.
Id.
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The District of Nebraska
1. Facts and Circumstances

The FBI was investigating a child pornography ring in which the
participants were using “The Onion Router” (“Tor”) software in order to
shield their identities on a bulletin board operating from Bellevue,
Nebraska, where they distributed child pornography and discussed
sexual abuse of children.175 “Tor involves the application of layers of
encryption (nested like layers of an onion) to anonymize communication
by sending the original data to its destination without revealing the
source IP address making it impossible to trace the communications
back through the network to the actual user who sent the
communication.”176
Because the IP addresses of those involved in the child
pornography bulletin board were unknown, the FBI sought a search
warrant to install a network investigative technique on the bulletin
board.177 A court authorized the use of a network investigative technique
between November 16, 2012, and December 2, 2012, on the bulletin
board so that each time someone accessed any of the bulletin board, the
device would cause the person’s computer to send data to an FBI
computer, which would assist agents in determining the identity of each
computer.178 Based on the use of this device, “the FBI was able to
identify a computer’s actual IP address and the date and time Website A
was accessed together with a date and time of accession with a unique
session identifier to distinguish the accession.”179 The discovery of these
IP addresses was the first step that led to administrative subpoenas,
additional search warrants, indictments, and arrests.
The various defendants filed motions to suppress information
obtained through the network investigative techniques authorized by the
search warrants. For purposes of each motion, the government stipulated
that the use of the device constituted a Fourth Amendment search on
each computer, which were located in the defendants’ various
175. United States v. Pierce, Nos. 8:13CR106, 8:13CR107, & 8:13CR108, 2014 WL 5173035,
at *3 (D. Neb. Oct. 14, 2014).
176. Id.; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Asia Pac. Telecom, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786-87
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (“[T]he Tor Project functions by rerouting a user’s online activity through an
international network of servers, allowing the user to reach an online destination through one of
many ‘exit nodes.’ The user’s destination site then records the exit node’s IP address rather than the
user’s true IP address, making it very difficult to trace the user’s true identity.”)
177. Pierce, 2014 WL 5173035, at *3.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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residences.180 After a hearing, a magistrate judge recommended that each
of the motions to suppress be denied.181 The district judge adopted this
recommendation.182
2. The Court’s Rationale
Regarding the search warrants for the defendants indicted for child
pornography offenses, this example actually involved defendants
seeking to suppress evidence obtained through the FBI’s use of a
network investigative technique. Based on the charge of child
pornography, there was nothing to indicate that the charged offenses
involve terrorism. Consequently, the territorial limitation based on Rule
41(b)(3) was inapplicable.
There were over fifteen defendants, and it was unclear where they
resided at the time they engaged in accessing or distributing child
pornography. However, because the identity of each defendant was
unknown at the time the order authorizing the network investigative
technique was sought, there was no basis for granting the search warrant
pursuant to Rule 41(b)(1). Although the computer operating the child
pornography bulletin board was located in Bellevue, Nebraska, at the
time of the applications, there was no information to establish any of the
defendants’ computers were located within the district. Therefore, Rule
41(b)(2) was also inapplicable.
Because the application did not seek authorization for a tracking
device, Rule 41(b)(4) was inapplicable.183 Finally, Rule 41(b)(5) was
inapplicable because the computer was not located in a United States
territory or diplomatic building. Therefore, regardless of the particularity
issue, a good argument exists here that the search warrants had no basis
for issuance pursuant to Rule 41(b).
IV. ALTHOUGH THE ISSUANCE OF WARRANTS FOR TROJAN DEVICES IS
PERMISSIBLE, IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE CAUTIOUS WHEN DOING SO
In presenting applications for authorization of Trojan devices, the
Government likely has alternatives to get electronic data related to its
criminal investigation. With a known email address, a federal agent may
apply for a “pen register” and “trap and trace” device.184 Regarding a
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at *8.
Id.at *10.
Id.at *6.
See United States v. Asghedom, 992 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174-75 (N.D. Ala. 2014).
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-27 (2012).
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telephone call, a pen register captures the outgoing information, whereas
a trap and trace device captures the incoming information.185 For an
application concerning an email, the Government may obtain the
addresses to and from for any messages sent, “the IP addresses of the
websites visited,” as well as “the total amount of data transmitted to or
from an account.”186 The benefit to the Government is that the standard
to obtain such information is very low and there is virtually no discretion
on the part of the magistrate judge if the following threshold is met: “if
the court finds that the attorney for the Government has certified to the
court that the information likely to be obtained by such installation and
use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.”187 Information
obtained from these applications may be used to further the criminal
investigation as well as possibly provide the basis for a search warrant,
including one that may seek to execute a Trojan device.
Furthermore, during the course of its criminal investigation, the
Government may also file an application in order to get various
subscriber information related to the email address from the provider.188
An application pursuant to § 2703 of the United States Code would
enable the Government to obtain the cell phone or internet subscriber’s
name, date of birth, address, the starting date and length of email service,
as well as potentially any financial information provided as a
subscriber.189 Although the standard is not as low as that for a pen
register, it is still lower than the probable cause standard required for a
search warrant:
A court order for disclosure . . . may be issued by any court that is a
court of competent jurisdiction and shall issue only if the governmental
entity offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic

185. Compare id. § 3127(3) with id. § 3127(4); see also Owsley, Cell Tower Dumps, supra
note 10, at 16 (discussing the differences between pen registers and trap and trace devices).
186. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hazelwood, No. 1:10 CR 150, 2011 WL 2553265, at *7 (N.D. Ohio June 28, 2011).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1); see also id. § 3122(b)(2) (the Government’s application must
include “a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency”). One judge has characterized the
court’s role as simply a rubber stamp for these applications. In re Order Authorizing the Installation
and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 846 F. Supp. 1555, 1563 (M.D. Fla 1994)
(“Since it is virtually impossible to botch the simple certification, the court under the Act seemingly
provides nothing more than a rubber stamp.”).
188. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
189. Id. § 2703(c)(2); Owsley, Cell Tower Dumps, supra note 10, at 16; In re § 2703(d) Order;
10GJ3793, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (E.D. Va. 2011); In re Application of the United States of
America for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 157 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 4

344

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:315

communication, or the records or other information sought, are rele190
vant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.

Again, any information obtained from these applications may be used to
further a criminal investigation as well as possibly provide the basis for a
search warrant, including one that may seek to execute a Trojan device.
In addition to the fact that the applications for these types of
devices do not fit squarely within Rule 41 because of the nature of both
computers and the internet, there are other concerns raised by these
devices. For example, when executed, these devices will seize
everything on the computer even though much may be unrelated to the
crime being investigated or to any criminal offense at all. Moreover, the
information seized may potentially be that of an innocent third party. In
both situations, there needs to be an acknowledgment not only that
irrelevant information may be caught up in the search, but that such
information must be protected and not kept by the Government.
In 2006, Rule 41 was revised in order to explicitly authorize
magistrate judges to issue warrants for tracking devices, which was
twenty years after the enactment of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act authorized tracking devices.191 The Judicial Conference’s
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure could propose a new rule
addressing how warrants should be issued for Trojan devices.192
Recently, the Department of Justice proposed a change to Rule 41 to
authorize search warrants for Trojan devices in all types of criminal
investigations.193 The proposed change specifically creates a new
subsection to search electronically stored information:

190. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order
Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 315
(3d Cir. 2010) (“the legislative history provides ample support for the proposition that the standard
is an intermediate one that is less stringent than probable cause”); Owsley, Cell Tower Dumps,
supra note 10, at 15-16; Peter P. Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 910
(2004).
191. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1859 (1986).
192. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2012); see also Laws and Procedures
Governing
the
Work
of
the
Rules
Committees,
UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/laws-procedures-governingwork-rules.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
193. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Wants Easier Process to Hack Suspects’ Computers, WASH. POST
(May 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-wants-easier-processto-hack-suspects-computers/2014/05/09/f30c37b0-d78d-11e3-8a78-8fe50322a72c_story.html; see
also Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Meeting Minutes (May 29-30, 2014), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST201405.pdf; Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Meeting Minutes (Apr. 7-8, 2014), available at
http://cryptome.org/2014/03/doj-hacker-attack.pdf.
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(b) Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government:

*****
(6) a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to
use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or
copy electronically stored information located within or outside the
district if:
(A) the district where the media or information is located has been
concealed through technological means; or
(B) in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), the
media are protected computers that have been damaged without au194
thorization and are located in five or more districts.

If adopted, the proposed rule would likely go into effect. As divided by
partisanship as Congress has been recently, it is unlikely that Congress
would even be able to reject any rule that the Supreme Court adopted.195
The technology involved in this generation of Trojan devices
utilized by the Government has far exceeded Congressional expectations
and understanding when the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
was enacted in 1986 and even when the Patriot Act was enacted in
2001.196 Professor Susan Freiwald has explained that Congress typically
does not amend statutes concerning electronic surveillance and privacy
matters until the federal courts strenuously raise the issue.197 Given this
structural problem, coupled with bipartisan intransigence, it is unlikely
Congress can solve this matter even if the courts push for it.
To the extent that these types of applications are permissible based
on a showing of probable cause consistent with the Fourth Amendment
as well as satisfaction of Rule 41’s requirements, the Government must
still address the concerns about how to handle documents and
information from third parties as well as non-relevant personal material
from the subjects of the investigation. Therefore, courts should begin
fashioning some type of protocol whenever the issuance of a search

194. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 193, at 499; Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules, supra note 193, at 499.
195. See Owsley, Cell Tower Dumps, supra note 10, at 42-43.
196. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311,
344 (2012).
197. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 687 (2011).
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warrant for a Trojan device is authorized by law.198 For example, in
obtaining a search warrant for a cell tower dump, a court ordered the
Government to “return any and all original records and copies, whether
hardcopy or in electronic format or storage, to the Provider, which are
determined to be not relevant to the Investigative Agency’s
investigation.”199 As another court explained regarding a search warrant
application for a suspect’s Facebook account, it will require “that some
safeguards must be put in place to prevent the government from
collecting and keeping indefinitely information to which it has no
right.”200 Indeed, Magistrate Judge John Facciola, presiding in federal
court in the District of Columbia, has issued several published decisions
in response to applications for search warrants, requiring the
Government to establish and adhere to a protocol to safeguard personal
information to which it is not entitled.201
Any application that would be granted consistent with the Fourth
Amendment and Rule 41 would also have to outline a protocol with
which the federal officers must comply regarding information or
documents obtained. First, the Government must be barred from keeping
any third party’s information that is unrelated to the criminal
investigation. Any hard copies regarding this information would have to
be destroyed, and any electronic records would have to be deleted. Of
course, if the criminal investigators could actually demonstrate that the
third party was a co-conspirator in the criminal conduct, then the
documents and information need not be destroyed.
Second, the law enforcement officials must differentiate between
information relevant to the subject of the investigation on the targeted
computer and non-relevant materials, such as personal photos and
198. See In re Application of the United States for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d),
964 F. Supp. 2d 674, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (“Although the use of a court-sanctioned cell tower
dump invariably leads to such information being provided to the Government, in order to receive
such data, the Government at a minimum should have a protocol to address how to handle this
sensitive private information.”); In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) Directing Providers to Provide Historical Cell Site Location
Records, 930 F. Supp. 2d 698, 702 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (same); see also Owsley, Cell Tower Dumps,
supra note 10, at 46 (recommending a protocol be designed for courts authorizing cell tower
dumps).
199. In re Cellular Telephone Towers, 945 F. Supp. 2d 769, 771 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
200. In re Information Associated with the Facebook Account Identified by the Username
Aaron.Alexis that is Stored at Premises Controlled by Facebook, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C.
2013).
201. In re Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, at *5-7 (D.D.C. 2014)
(application seeking authorization to search a cell phone); In re ODYS LOOX Plus Tablet, Serial
Number 4707213703415, in Custody of United States Postal Inspection Serv., 28 F. Supp. 3d 40, 46
(D.D.C. 2014) (application seeking authorization to search a computer).
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financial information that does not evidence any criminal activity. Any
hard copies of the latter materials must be destroyed, while any
electronic records must be deleted.
V. CONCLUSION
There are both dangers and benefits that come with the
Government’s use of Trojan devices. There is a danger that such devices
will collect information not meant to be obtained from innocent third
parties. However, one benefit is that these devices enable the
Government to catch criminals that may have evaded them in the past.
Other good news about the government’s use of Trojan devices is that
the government seeks a search warrant when using the devices, which it
often does not do in other applications for electronic surveillance. The
problem, however, is that some magistrate judges, in reviewing the
Trojan device applications, are not closely hewing to the requirements of
Rule 41(b) and are granting these applications where the rule should not
allow them.
Ultimately, judges reviewing applications for search warrants must
be diligent in ensuring that the standards are satisfied before granting
them. Moreover, judges must account for the likelihood that third party
data may be swept up within any search and develop appropriate
protocols to safeguard innocent individual’s privacy. This measure is
necessary to ensure that, while the Government pursues criminals, the
rights of the American people are not violated.
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